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Guaranteed versus Direct Lending
The Case of Student Loans
Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
7.1    Introduction
The federal government makes low-  cost ﬁ  nancing for higher educa-
tion widely available through its fast-  growing student loan programs. The 
existence of two competing government programs—the Federal Fam-
ily Educational Loan Program (guaranteed program) and the Federal 
Direct Loan Program (direct program)—provides a unique opportunity to 
compare the cost to the government of direct federal lending versus loan 
guarantees.
Both the direct and guaranteed student loan program oﬀer their borrow-
ers very similar loan products and terms, but the programs diﬀer signiﬁ  cantly 
from the perspective of other key stakeholders, including educational insti-
tutions, commercial lenders, and state guarantee agencies. The programs 
also have widely divergent budget costs: The Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 budget 
records a 2 percent subsidy rate on direct loans, versus a subsidy rate of 10 
percent for the guaranteed program.
In this study, we propose and implement a methodology to provide a 
comprehensive cost estimate for the two programs in market value terms, 
and analyze the sources of the diﬀerential. There are several reasons for 
emphasizing market values. Arguably, they are the best estimate of the 
cost of federal obligations from the perspective of taxpayers. Increasingly, 
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federal and local government agencies incorporate market valuation prin-
ciples in cost-  beneﬁ  t analyses (e.g., Gramlich 1990). Further, almost all 
noncredit transactions—including grants, purchases of goods, and the 
direct provision of services—appear in the budget at market prices (Lucas 
and Phaup, chapter 3 in this volume). In the context of improving access 
to higher education, outright grants are the main alternative to subsidized 
loans. The omission of certain costs for loans and loan guarantees under-
states their true cost to taxpayers, and artiﬁ  cially favors expanding the stu-
dent loan programs over funding for grants.
Obtaining market value estimates allows us to address the question of how 
much of the diﬀerence in reported subsidy rates can be attributed to real cost 
diﬀerences between the programs, and how much is due to idiosyncrasies in 
the rules for budgeting federal credit. To preview the main results, we ﬁ  nd 
that budget costs for both programs are well below their market value. This 
is mostly attributable to budget rules that require discounting expected net 
cash ﬂ  ows at Treasury rates. Understatement of the market cost of capital 
also accounts for why some direct loans appear to make money for the gov-
ernment, despite the favorable terms oﬀered to borrowers. Administrative 
costs are accounted for inconsistently across programs, with some costs of 
the direct program not incorporated into the subsidy rate.
Even after adjusting for the market cost of capital, asymmetric treatment 
of administrative costs, and other inconsistencies in how the programs are 
budgeted for, the guaranteed program appears to be fundamentally more 
expensive than the direct program. Adjusting for the cost of risk has little 
eﬀect on the diﬀerential, since the government bears most of the credit risk 
in either case. The diﬀerential can be attributed primarily to the fact that 
guaranteed lenders are paid more than is required to induce them to lend 
at statutory terms. The excess payments appear to be partially absorbed in 
competition for borrowers, which occurs through various discounts, market-
ing activities, and higher service levels and subsidies to educational institu-
tions. To the extent that the market is not perfectly competitive, guaranteed 
lenders presumably are able to retain some of the surplus. The direct pro-
gram also has a real cost advantage. As well as lower administrative costs, 
the direct program has the advantage of raising funds via the Treasury rather 
than through private ﬁ  nancial institutions. The size of the Treasury’s appar-
ent advantage, and whether it should be considered a real cost saving, is also 
discussed.
In light of its cost disadvantage, a natural question is whether the guar-
anteed program provides oﬀsetting beneﬁ  ts. In principal, private interme-
diaries can add value; for instance, through better screening or monitoring 
of borrowers. Student loans, however, have categorical entitlement and an 
almost full credit guarantee, making the value added by private interme-
diation less obvious. Beyond loan administration, the guaranteed program 
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but these transfers might be better targeted and controlled if they were sepa-
rated from the lending function.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides an 
overview of federal student loan programs: their size, product oﬀerings, 
the roles of various stakeholders, and their market structure. Section 7.3 
describes how student loans and loan guarantees are budgeted for; how these 
rules lead to budget estimates that are inconsistent with market valuation; 
and the decomposition of costs in the budget. In section 7.4 we discuss the 
private student market and the information it provides on the market cost 
of capital and the composition of administrative costs. In section 7.5 we 
turn to the central problem of estimating the market cost of the direct and 
guaranteed loan programs. The resulting market value estimates are pre-
sented and subjected to sensitivity analysis. Section 7.6 assesses cost from the 
perspective of guaranteed lenders. Section 7.7 concludes with a discussion 
of some of the broader policy questions raised by the analysis, and of the 
implications of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis for the student loan market.
7.2    Overview
The Department of Education (ED) oversees two competing student loan 
programs: the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL, or guaranteed) pro-
gram, and the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (direct loan) program. 
In the guaranteed program, which dates back to the mid-  1960s, the gov-
ernment guarantees loans originated by private lenders against losses from 
default and makes supplemental payments to lenders. In the direct program, 
which began operation much more recently in 1994, the government directly 
lends to qualifying students.
7.2.1    Program  Size
The federal student loan program is one of the largest credit programs 
operated by the US government. Table 7.1 shows the rapid growth in total 
federally- backed student loans outstanding, which in 2005 totaled over $380 
billion. Statistics compiled by the Department of Education indicate that in 
the same year, about 6.8 million students, and 750,000 parents of students, 
borrowed $56 billion in new federally-  backed loans. The guaranteed pro-
gram was responsible for 77 percent of this new loan volume. Another 2.5 
million borrowers took advantage of the option to convert their outstanding 
Staﬀord loans into more favorable consolidation loans, resulting in $69.6 
billion of new consolidation loans.
7.2.2    Product  Oﬀerings and Loan Terms
Both the direct and guaranteed programs oﬀer three basic types of loans: 
Staﬀord Loans, Parent Loans to Undergraduate Students (PLUS), and 166        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
Consolidation loans. We restrict the analysis to Staﬀord and Consolidation 
loans, since these comprise the vast majority of loans in both programs.
The terms on all loans are set by statute under the Higher Education Act. 
From the perspective of students, the terms on Staﬀord and Consolidation 
loans are virtually identical under both the direct and guaranteed programs. 
Government payments to and from guaranteed lenders are also set by stat-
ute, and diﬀer across loan types.
Staﬀord
These ten-  to thirty- year loans are available to students enrolled in eligible 
educational institutions, which includes most US colleges and universities 
but not trade or for-  proﬁ  t schools. Between 1998 and July 2006, these loans 
carried a ﬂ  oating rate that reset annually, based on the three- month Treasury 
rate plus a ﬁ  xed spread. Since July 2006, Staﬀord loans carry a ﬁ  xed 6.8 per-
cent per annum interest rate, with ﬂ  exible repayment plans that begin upon 
completion or dropping out of a course of study.1 Borrowers in the guaran-
teed program are assessed a onetime 2 percent origination fee, although this 
may be paid by the lender.2 Borrowers pay a further 1 percent guarantee fee 
at origination that accrues to guaranty agencies in the guaranteed program. 
In the direct program borrowers are charged 3 percent upfront, although 
they can receive a 1.5 percent rebate for an on-  time ﬁ  rst payment.3
Although all Staﬀord loans carry below-  market rates, the loans are fur-
ther classiﬁ  ed as “subsidized” or “unsubsidized.” The federal government 
pays all of the accrued interest on subsidized Staﬀord loans while a borrower 
Table 7.1  Federal student loans outstanding, 1998–2005
    1998   1999   2000   2001   2002   2003   2004   2005
FFEL
  Unconsolidated 
(Staﬀord and PLUS)
74,727 92,760 106,220 122,423 129,757 130,455 142,405 148,391
  Consolidated 9,675 20,008 27,891 32,384 49,434 79,017 100,176 138,457
  Subtotal 84,402 112,768 134,111 154,807 179,191 209,472 242,581 286,848
Direct
  Unconsolidated 
(Staﬀord and PLUS)
26,937 33,763 43,091 47,958 50,264 51,013 52,090 47,679
  Consolidated 4,733 12,067 14,622 22,526 29,807 33,507 37,155 47,027
  Subtotal 31,670 45,830 57,713 70,484 80,071 84,520 89,245 94,706
Total   116,072   158,598   191,824   225,291   259,262   293,992   331,826   381,554
Source: OMB, as reported in the budget appendix.
1. From July 2008, the rate on new loans is scheduled to decline in gradual increments until 
it reaches 3.4 percent in July 2011 before reverting to 6.8 percent in July 2012, at which time the 
Higher Education Act comes up for reauthorization. The analysis here is based on the rules in 
eﬀect from August 2006 to June 2007.
2. Under current law, the origination fee phases out over the next several years.
3. Historically, the guarantee fee has also been waived, but this is no longer the case.Guaranteed versus Direct Lending: The Case of Student Loans    1 6 7
is in school, grace period, or deferment, whereas interest accrues on unsub-
sidized loans. Eligibility for subsidized loans is based on income.
On Staﬀord loans, guaranteed lenders receive special allowance payments 
(SAP) from the government that provide net cash ﬂ  ows (including payments 
from students) equal to the three-  month commercial paper rate plus a ﬁ  xed 
spread. The spread is 1.74 percent while students are in school and 2.34 per-
cent when loans are in repayment. The spread is primarily compensation 
for administrative costs rather than risk, since lenders also are reimbursed 
for 97 to 99 percent of principal and accrued interest on loans that default, 
and the commercial paper (CP) rate is approximately the cost of capital for 
federally guaranteed loans (see section 7.4.1, subsection “Capital Cost for 
Guaranteed Loans”). Net payments to lenders are reduced by a onetime, 50 
basis point origination fee assessed on lenders.4 Guaranty agencies receive 
40 basis points (bps) of this origination fee, reducing the net federal cash 
inﬂ  ow to 10 basis points.
Consolidation
Borrowers with one or more Staﬀord loans may replace them with a single 
Consolidation loan any time after completing their course of study. Consoli-
dation loans oﬀer a new repayment plan and a ﬁ  xed interest rate equal to the 
weighted average of interest rates on the underlying Staﬀord loans rounded 
up to the nearest eighth of a percentage point. Thus, the portion of post- July 
2006 Staﬀord loans that are consolidated will carry a rate slightly above 6.8 
percent. Consolidation loans now oﬀer a similar set of ﬂ  exible repayment 
terms as do Staﬀord loans, but in the past also provided additional repay-
ment extension options.
Guaranteed lenders receive lower compensation from the government for 
Consolidation than for Staﬀord loans. For Consolidation loans, the spread 
over the three-  month commercial paper rate, net of fees, is 1.59 percent. In 
addition, they pay a further origination fee of 50 bps, of which 40 bps goes 
to the guaranty agencies. Despite generating less income than Staﬀord loans, 
the net return on the loans is generally positive, and competition to oﬀer 
these loans until recently has been brisk. However, it appears that guaran-
teed lenders avoid consolidating distressed loans, since a disproportionate 
share of distressed loans is consolidated into the direct loan program.
7.2.3    Stakeholders
Students and parents of students pursuing post-  secondary degrees are 
direct beneﬁ  ciaries of these programs, which lower the cost and increase the 
availability of funding for higher education. Unsubsidized Staﬀord loans 
are not means- tested, and borrowing limits are tied to educational expenses, 
which are higher at private and four- year institutions. Hence, students from 
4. This fee will increase to 1 percentage point beginning October 2007.168        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
middle-   and upper-  income-  class families receive a large share of total pro-
gram beneﬁ  ts. From an economic perspective, loan assistance can be wel-
fare improving when imperfections in private credit markets limit access to 
education, or when education has signiﬁ  cant positive externalities.5 A caveat 
is that some students may take on an excessive amount of debt to pay for 
degrees that add little to their earning potential.
Educational institutions also depend on federal student loan programs 
for ﬁ  nancial support. Without assistance, many students would be unable 
or unwilling to pay the high tuition charges at many schools.6 To a lesser 
extent, schools beneﬁ  t directly if they elect to participate in the guaranteed 
loan program. Guaranteed lenders oﬀer schools various types of support in 
exchange for featuring their loans, including educational grants and admin-
istrative, educational, and systems support to ﬁ  nancial aid oﬃces. In “school 
as lender” programs, where the educational institution itself takes on the 
origination role, the school retains the excess of government payments over 
its cost of extending credit.
The guaranteed loan industry—lenders, servicers, and guarantee agen-
cies—also have a large stake in the program. Providing ﬁ  nancing for guaran-
teed student loans has been a proﬁ  table line of business for guaranteed lend-
ers, although competition in the industry has intensiﬁ  ed over time. Although 
there are more than 3,500 for- proﬁ  t and not- for- proﬁ  t lenders, the market is 
dominated by a few large for-  proﬁ  t players, including the leading commer-
cial banks and Sallie Mae. Sallie Mae, by far the largest guaranteed lender, 
began as a government-  sponsored enterprise but now is fully privatized.
State and private nonproﬁ  t guaranty agencies administer the federal guar-
antee and provide services to schools and lenders. As of 2006, there were 
thirty- ﬁ  ve active guaranty agencies, some operating in multiple states. Each 
guaranty agency maintains an account in federal trust, which is used to pay 
out claims from lenders. Those funds are replenished by the federal govern-
ment. Guaranty agencies also receive federal funds for performing collection 
activities, historically as high as 25 percent of the recovered amounts (even if 
the amount was recovered through federal loan consolidation). The agencies 
may use their share of collections to fund scholarships, education outreach 
programs, and default aversion activities.
7.2.4    Market  Structure
To evaluate the costs associated with lending and the likely disposition of 
the rents created when government payments exceed the cost of guaranteed 
5. Several studies question the eﬀectiveness of such policies; for example, De Fraja (2002), 
Dynarski (2002), Edlin (1993), Hanushek (1998), and Keane (2002). Gale (1991) points out 
that many federal credit programs probably have a small real eﬀect on the allocation of credit, 
in many cases simply crowding out private borrowing and lending.
6. Some have argued that the generous borrowing limits in the federal student loan program 
have accommodated the growth in college tuition, which has exceeded the growth of the overall 
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lending, it is necessary to understand how the market for student loans is 
organized and the extent to which it is competitive.
Schools have a choice of whether to participate in the direct or guaranteed 
loan program, and all of its students must borrow through that program. 
Simultaneous participation in both programs is not permitted, but a school 
can elect to switch programs and some choose to do so.7 Competition for vol-
ume between the two programs therefore centers on school administrators, 
particularly ﬁ  nancial aid oﬃcers. Recall that both programs oﬀer students 
nearly identical loan terms, so diﬀerentiation occurs primarily along other 
dimensions. The direct program oﬀers greater administrative simplicity, 
which initially attracted many schools to the program. Guaranteed lenders 
responded by oﬀering schools and borrowers improved service and other 
inducements, and since the late 1990s the guaranteed program has slowly 
regained market share (see ﬁ  gure 7.1).
Competition also takes place at the school level between guaranteed lend-
ers. Although there are thousands of lenders potentially competing for bor-
rowers’ business, at the individual institutions competition is much more 
limited. The ﬁ  nancial aid oﬃce serves as a gatekeeper, counseling students 
who seek advice, and only including a limited number of lenders on its “pre-
ferred lender list.”8 Most students have little ﬁ  nancial experience and rely 
on the advice of the school, although direct-  to-  student marketing of loan 
products has become more common, and some students venture beyond the 
preferred lender list.
The market for consolidation loans is more competitive because borrow-
ers are free to choose between the direct program and any guaranteed lender. 
In recent years, very favorable terms on consolidation loans led to high rates 
of consolidation and the entry of competitive new entrants into the con-
solidation business. Under the new ﬁ  xed rate regime, consolidation is less 
advantageous to students, and since it is also ﬁ  nancially disadvantageous to 
Staﬀord lenders, its prevalence has been declining.
We conclude that because of the active competition between guaranteed 
lenders to capture volume, it is likely that all but the most eﬃcient lenders 
retain little in the way of abnormal proﬁ  ts. The gatekeeper role of schools 
further suggests that they are in a position to capture a large portion of 
rents, but those may be passed through to students through scholarships, 
expanded program oﬀerings, or other means. The common practice of lend-
ers paying all or part of the origination fee for students and oﬀering beneﬁ  ts 
like discounts for on-  time payments is direct evidence that some of the rent 
7. A single university may have some schools participating in the direct program and others 
using the guaranteed program.
8. Northwestern University provides a fairly typical example. It includes ﬁ  ve major lenders 
on its preferred list for undergraduate students. It does not oﬃcially rank them, but Citibank 
holds the coveted ﬁ  rst position on the (nonalphabetical) list. The preferred lender lists for its 
various graduate and professional schools are shorter. The business, law, and medical schools 
oﬀer only three options, with the ﬁ  rst one being Northwestern University itself. Only two lend-
ers are recommended to students pursuing part-  time MBAs.170        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
goes directly to students. Some rents, however, are absorbed by marketing 
costs and inducements to schools and ﬁ  nancial aid oﬃcers that seem unlikely 
to provide much beneﬁ  t to students.
7.3    Budget  Estimates
Most analyses of the cost diﬀerence between the direct and guaranteed 
loan programs rely on budget estimates prepared by the Congressional 
Budget Oﬃce (CBO) and the Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Although the underlying premise of this study is that market value esti-
mates oﬀer a more accurate representation of cost than do budget esti-
mates, the budget provides a useful and more familiar starting point for 
evaluating program cost. In this section we describe the rules governing 
budgeting for credit, noting where they deviate from market valuation 
principles. We also discuss what budget estimates reveal about the break-
down of cost for the two programs, and how those comparisons can be 
misleading.
7.3.1      Budgeting for Federal Student Loan Programs
Before 1990, credit, like most other government programs, was accounted 
for on a cash basis. Under cash basis accounting, new direct loan programs 
have a very high up-  front cost since the loan principal is recorded as a cash 
outﬂ  ow. In contrast, loan guarantees initially can appear to make money, 
since fees are paid up-  front but the cash ﬂ  ows associated with defaults may 
not materialize for many years. The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 
(FCRA) made the treatment of direct and guaranteed loans more symmetric 
Fig. 7.1    The direct program share of new federal student(?) loan volume
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by eﬀectively putting credit on an accrual basis, with cost measured as a net 
discounted value of expected current and future cash ﬂ  ows associated with 
the current year commitment.
Federal budget rules have had a signiﬁ  cant eﬀect on the structure and 
evolution of the federal student loan programs. Most notably, the direct 
student loan program appears to have been made feasible from a budgetary 
perspective by FCRA. Proposed on several occasions in the late 1980s, direct 
lending’s high initial cash cost was a decisive obstacle. The direct loan pro-
gram was enacted in 1993, shortly after the FCRA went into eﬀect.
7.3.2      Budget Cost versus Market Cost
Before turning to the budget estimates, it is important to understand in 
general terms why those numbers are systematically lower than the market 
value estimates of cost presented later on. The main reason for the down-
ward bias is that FCRA mandates using maturity-  matched Treasury rates 
without risk adjustment for discounting. This practice makes both direct 
and guaranteed loans appear less costly to the government than when dis-
counting at market rates.
The omission of certain administrative costs further lowers budget esti-
mates relative to comprehensive market value estimates. In addition, admin-
istrative costs are accounted for inconsistently across the two programs. 
Most administrative costs associated with guaranteed loans are included 
in the reported subsidy rate. By contrast, administrative costs in the direct 
program are accounted for separately and on a cash basis, and so are not 
included in subsidy estimates.9
A discrepancy between budget and market cost also arises from CBO’s 
budgetary treatment of ﬂ  oating rate loans.10 The CBO interprets FCRA as 
requiring the use of ﬁ  nal maturity-  matched Treasury rates for discounting, 
whereas market valuations reﬂ  ect the shorter eﬀective maturity of ﬂ  oating 
rate loans, which equals the time to the next rate reset. Because of the term 
premium in long-  term rates, this tends to bias down federal estimates of 
ﬂ  oating rate direct loan value relative to their market value. Although the 
switch to ﬁ  xed rates for new student loans after June 2006 reduces this dis-
tortion prospectively, federal payments to guaranteed lenders still depend 
9. Administrative costs for most federal loan programs are accounted for separately on a 
cash basis, and hence do not appear in subsidy rates.
10. This misvaluation has potential real eﬀects. For instance, it prompted the Department of 
Education to propose a sale of direct loans in 2003. The loans had a higher market than budget 
value because the relatively high level of long-  term rates caused the government to discount 
future guaranteed cash ﬂ  ows at a higher than market rate. The plan was to sell the loans, apply 
some of the proceeds to paying oﬀ Treasury debt, and to use the net gain to provide additional 
assistance to students. In fact, the sale would have entailed additional administrative costs 
without generating any real savings; the loans could not have been sold for more than a fair 
price. The OMB treats ﬂ  oating rates as short-  term rates, so this problem is not reﬂ  ected in the 
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on short-  term interest rates and this convention will tend to bias down that 
component of cost in CBO estimates.
7.3.3    Budget  Cost  Decomposition
The Credit Supplement to the Budget, prepared by OMB, provides a 
breakdown of subsidy cost across four cost components—defaults, inter-
est, fees and other—for four loan categories (Staﬀord Subsidized, Staﬀord 
Unsubsidized, PLUS, and Consolidated). Table 7.2 reproduces some of this 
data from the 2007 Credit Supplement. The total subsidy rate is the dis-
counted value of projected net losses divided by the underlying loan prin-
cipal at origination.
Both the direct and guarantee programs report small but similar subsidy 
cost components for defaults. The last two columns of table 7.2 break out 
cumulative lifetime default rates and recovery rates. Recovery rate estimates 
in excess of 100 percent are attributable to OMB’s reporting convention 
rather than to exceptional performance: recovery amounts are not dis-
counted and not all collection costs are deducted. After discounting and 
adjusting for collection costs, we estimate that the federal recovery rate aver-
aged about 50 percent, in line with experience in the private student loan 
market. We also cannot reconcile the low reported default rates with our 
calculation of default rates from historical data from the Department of 
Education, which are described in section 7.5.
Default rates are for the most part similar in the two programs, reﬂ  ecting 
similarities in the borrower populations. The exception is for consolidation 
loans, which experience much higher default rates in the direct program. 
As noted earlier, the higher default rate may be explained by the reluctance 
of guaranteed lenders to consolidate loans on the brink of default, and the 
fact that the direct program must consolidate the loans of qualiﬁ  ed bor-
rowers that wish to consolidate but have been turned down by guaranteed 
lenders.
For the remaining components of subsidy cost, the breakdown is markedly 
diﬀerent across the direct and guaranteed programs. The biggest diﬀerence 
is that the direct program reports large interest income, whereas the guaran-
teed program reports large interest costs. This occurs in part because OMB 
deﬁ  nes the “interest” component of cost very diﬀerently across programs. 
In the direct program, the government reports net interest income as the 
present value of any interest paid by borrowers in excess of the Treasury 
rate, which it takes as the government’s cost of capital. Because the bor-
rower interest rate exceeds the Treasury rate, this item reduces the reported 
subsidy cost. In contrast, the interest component in the guaranteed pro-
gram represents the present value of the net payments made to guaranteed 
lenders, which is an outﬂ  ow. Although classiﬁ  ed as interest, these payments 
are more accurately described as covering administrative and other costs, 
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the reported “interest costs” cannot be meaningfully compared without 
adjustments.
Administrative costs in the direct program that are borne directly by the 
federal government are excluded from subsidy estimates, and do not appear 
in table 7.2. Costs that entail payments to third parties for tasks such as col-
lecting on loans do appear, and are recorded in the category “other.” In the 
guaranteed program, the corresponding costs are accounted for as part of 
“interest,” as just discussed.
Fees levied on borrowers, guaranteed lenders, and guaranty agencies 
reduce subsidy costs. Only borrower fees aﬀect the direct loan program, 
and they make a negative contribution to the subsidy rate. For the guaran-
teed program, these fees also include the upfront application fee on Staﬀord 
and PLUS loans in both programs, as well as the 1.05 percent per annum 
consolidation fee paid by guaranteed lenders to the federal government. 
Logically it makes more sense to think of lender fees as reducing the net 
administrative payments from the government to guaranteed lenders. To 
facilitate comparison, a more parallel treatment of administrative costs is 
presented in section 7.5.
7.4      Inferring Economic Costs and Cost Diﬀerentials
Estimating market cost requires a comprehensive measure of the cash 
ﬂ  ows associated with each program, and also a measure of the cost of capi-
tal. We impute the market risk premium on student loans from pricing in 
the private student loan market, and also use lender data to infer some 
components of administrative cost.
Private lenders primarily serve students who have exceeded federal lend-
ing limits.11 The main players in the private loan market are also the largest 
guaranteed lenders—Sallie Mae and major national and regional commer-
cial banks. Economies of scale in marketing, systems administration, and 
funding, and the experience gained from guaranteed lending, give these insti-
tutions a competitive advantage over other potential entrants. Although 
students can obtain private loans on their own, as with guaranteed lending, 
students often rely on the ﬁ  nancial aid oﬃce for recommendations, which 
as for federal loans tends to limit direct competition between lenders for 
individual students.
The private loan market provides data that is useful in estimating inputs 
into the market value of government loans and loan guarantees. Some 
diﬀerences in the borrower populations and loan characteristics, however, 
11. Limits are currently set at a cumulative amount of $23,000 for undergraduates and a 
$65,500 combined limit for undergraduate and graduate. There are also various annual limits 
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suggest some caution. We discuss these diﬀerences and their implications 
for imputed capital and administrative costs.
7.4.1    Cost  of  Capital
We consider two distinct aspects of the cost of capital. First we estimate 
the discount rate for cash ﬂ  ows associated with uninsured student loans, 
which is a critical input for the total cost calculations. We also estimate the 
diﬀerential between the cost to guaranteed lenders of funding guaranteed 
student loans in the capital markets, and the government’s cost of raising 
funds through the Treasury. The latter is informative because it may be a 
source of higher real costs for guaranteed lending, and because it aﬀects the 
minimum compensation required by guaranteed lenders.
Finding the Risk-  Adjusted Discount Rate
The starting point for our analysis of the cost of capital for federal student 
loans is the typical interest rates charged by lenders on private student loans 
in 2006. Rates ranged from LIBOR 2 to LIBOR 7 percent (LIBOR stands 
for London Interbank Oﬀered Rate). The rate oﬀered varies by credit score 
and educational institution, but LIBOR 4 percent was typical. Assuming a 
30 bps spread between one- year LIBOR and one- year Treasury, the interest 
rate spread over one-  year Treasury is on average about 4.3 percent.
What we mean by “the market cost of capital” is the discount rate that a 
fully private entity would use to value a claim on the net cash ﬂ  ows received 
by the government. The present value calculations can then be interpreted 
as what it would cost, on a per loan basis, to induce a competitive private 
entity to run each program. Since not all of the cash ﬂ  ows associated 
with the two programs have identical exposure to student loan risk, we 
adjust the risk premium to correspond to the risk of the various major 
components of cash ﬂ  ow, as described in more detail in section 7.5.3 and 
appendix B.
To derive the market cost of capital we adjust the rate charged to stu-
dents for a variety of factors.12 The 4.3 percent spread charged to students 
over Treasury rates has several components: it includes a risk premium 
that arises from the systematic risk in loan losses; administrative costs not 
covered by fees; expected losses from default; taxes; and a liquidity pre-
mium.13 For our purposes, the market cost of capital is taken to include 
12. Ideally, cost of capital estimates would be based on secondary market interest rates, 
which do not bundle ﬁ  nancing costs with transaction costs. Unfortunately, data on whole loan 
secondary market transactions are not available.
13. The term “liquidity premium” is generally used to describe the component of credit 
spreads over Treasury rates not easily explained by other factors. The liquidity premium is 
thought to arise either from perceived risks that are not evident in historical data, or from the 
possibility that an absence of market participants could make it diﬃcult to sell the security at 
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the risk premium for systematic risk, the tax spread, and the liquidity 
premium. Default losses and administrative costs are excluded from the 
capital cost because they are explicitly accounted for in the derivation of 
expected cash ﬂ  ows.
The market cost of capital is identiﬁ  ed by starting with the average 4.3 
percent spread over Treasury, and subtracting estimates of administrative 
costs and expected default losses. As discussed below, administrative costs 
borne directly by guaranteed lenders, expressed as an annual cost rate, are 
on order of 97 bps. We add to this 15 bps to account for the higher costs of 
private over guaranteed loans. This leaves 3.18 percent for a risk premium, 
expected default losses, taxes, and a residual liquidity premium. We estimate 
the annual default loss rate from federal student loan data to be .75 percent 
per annum (see section 7.5), and assume it is slightly lower than default losses 
on private loans, which we take to be 1 percent. This leaves a 2.18 percent 
spread—the market cost of capital—that is attributable to the market risk 
premium, liquidity, and taxes. It is not possible to identify the size of the 
separate components, but we use this market premium in the base case cost 
analysis in the next section.
An alternative approach would be to approximate private lenders’ cost of 
capital by looking at the weighted average cost of debt and equity capital 
for publicly-  traded ﬁ  rms in this business. This turns out to be impractical 
for several reasons. First, there are few publicly-  traded companies whose 
primary business is making and funding private student loans, as most 
of the big public lenders are divisions of major banks and do not report 
separately. The few public companies that specialize in private loans have 
been in business for a fairly short time, and given the volatility of returns, 
estimates based on a short history entail a high degree of uncertainty. 
Further, private lenders tend to manage risk through various contractual 
arrangements—for instance, through securitization structures and pur-
chased credit guarantees—so their cost of capital does not accurately reﬂ  ect 
whole- loan  risk.
Capital Cost for Guaranteed Loans
The cost of capital for guaranteed lenders is lower than for private lend-
ers because of the government guarantee. Nevertheless, their capital cost 
appears to exceed that of the Treasury. Here we consider the determinants 
of their borrowing costs.
Guaranteed lenders routinely obtain funding by securitizing parcels of 
previously originated federal loans and selling these asset-  backed securities 
to investors, at a weighted average rate slightly over LIBOR.14 This indicates 
14. The LIBOR is a market interest rate frequently used on interbank loans between high-
  quality commercial banks. The default risk on LIBOR is thought to be small, but positive. 
Typically, LIBOR is 20 to 30 bps over the corresponding Treasury rate, but the spread varies 
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that private investors do not view guaranteed loans as perfect substitutes for 
Treasury securities, despite the 97 to 99 percent federal credit guarantee.15 In 
addition, lenders bear underwriting, Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) ﬁ  ling, and other administrative fees that add to the total cost of capi-
tal for guaranteed loans. In comparison with the cost of Treasury funding 
for direct loans, it appears that even the largest guaranteed lenders typically 
pay 25 to 35 basis points more than the government to borrow.
There are a number of factors that may account for the premium over 
Treasury rates paid by guaranteed lenders. One is that a guaranteed loan is 
not truly risk-  free—as well as the residual 1 to 3 percent retained default 
risk, lenders who fail to administer loans according to ED policy and regula-
tions may have the guarantee voided for those loans. The exemption of Trea-
sury interest from state and local taxes also lowers Treasury rates relative 
to LIBOR. Further, securitized student loans are less liquid than Treasury 
securities. The prepayment and extension options create uncertainty that 
increases investors’ required return, as evidenced by higher spreads on the 
tranches of securitizations that absorb these risks.
Whether or not this higher funding cost is indicative of a real cost advan-
tage of the government is debatable. Clearly, out- of- pocket funding costs are 
lower for the government, but the beneﬁ  t may come at a commensurate cost 
to other stakeholders. For instance, the exemption from state and local taxes 
is a beneﬁ  t to the federal government that is oﬀset by the cost to local govern-
ments. The liquidity advantage may arise from the government’s special legal 
status and ability to impose taxes, which lowers government expenditures 
at a hidden cost to taxpayers. We do not attempt to resolve the question of 
to what extent the cost advantage is real, but as a point of comparison we 
estimate what a 30 basis point per annum funding advantage is worth over 
the life of a loan.
7.4.2    Administrative  Costs
Diﬀerences in administrative expenses on guaranteed loans and direct 
loans are an important driver of the economic cost diﬀerential between 
programs. Here we show that while many costs are similar in both programs, 
there are some additional costs associated with guaranteed lending that 
appear to make it fundamentally more expensive.
Administrative functions associated with all credit provision include 
origination, servicing, collection, and general overhead. Guaranteed lend-
ers also consider the fees paid to the government to be administrative costs. 
From a programmatic perspective, however, lender fees aﬀect the net cash 
ﬂ  ows from the government; they are not a program cost. The task of iden-
tifying administrative costs and allocating them across these activities is 
15. This discussion is based on securitizations of ﬂ  oating rate loans, and prospectus data 
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complicated by limitations on data availability, but ﬁ  nancial reports from 
ED and information from some guaranteed lenders provide the basis for 
our inferences.
Most lenders that originate private loans are also in the guaranteed loan 
business, and administrative costs appear similar for private and guaran-
teed loans (some minor caveats are discussed later). Financial statements 
from one such dual lender provides some data on administrative costs. The 
reports break noninterest expense into various categories. Some costs, such 
as servicing, apply to a portion of the outstanding loan portfolio in repay-
ment, while other costs are incurred for origination activity, but do not 
apply to the outstanding portfolio. Although these ﬁ  nancial reports do not 
allocate costs by activity, the reported numbers can be used to make some 
rough imputations.16 We attribute 80 percent of personnel, consulting, and 
occupancy expenses to origination, 100 percent of promotional expenses to 
origination, and 50 percent of computer and other expenses to origination. 
Total origination expenses, divided by total volume of Staﬀord and private 
originations, is .95 percent. Representing this as an annual rate spread based 
on a ten-  year amortizing loan implies an origination cost rate of 22 bps. 
The remaining noninterest expenses, divided by the portfolio of loans in 
repayment, yields an annual cost of 45 basis points. Thus, the dual lender 
directly bears an amortized cost of 67 basis points excluding collection costs, 
which we account for separately in default losses. Beyond this, the onetime 
origination fee paid to the government, debt issuance costs, spread over 
LIBOR on debt issued, and miscellaneous other expenses are estimated to 
add .3 percent to annual costs. Finally, we add an additional 10 bps for costs 
incurred by ED for administration of the guaranteed program, yielding a 
total administrative cost rate of 107 bps for guaranteed loans.
We want to emphasize that this estimate must be interpreted with caution. 
First, eﬃciency may vary considerably across lenders and there is likely to 
be considerable variation in administrative costs. Further, these costs re-
ﬂ  ect the current regulatory and organizational structure of the student loan 
market. Guaranteed lender origination costs include expenditures for the 
higher service levels and marketing expenses that arise from competition 
for borrowers and excess payments from the government that fund these 
practices. A diﬀerent delivery system or lower federal payments to lenders 
would presumably reduce certain administrative expenditures.
The administrative costs for the direct program appear to be signiﬁ  cantly 
lower than for guaranteed lenders, even taking into account costs that do not 
appear as part of the reported subsidy rate. An annual appropriation to the 
Department of Education covers the administrative costs of the direct pro-
16. Simply dividing total noninterest expense over the loan portfolio would be misleading 
because for a growing company not at a steady state, a disproportionate share of the total 
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gram, although some of these costs are attributable to administering both 
the direct and guaranteed programs. This appropriation was approximately 
$800 million in 2006. At that time, the outstanding direct program portfolio 
was approximately $100 billion and the guaranteed portfolio approximately 
$300 billion.17 In verbal disclosures, the Department reported allocating 
approximately $200 million of the appropriation to direct program servic-
ing contracts, $30 million to direct program origination contracts, and $200 
million to direct and guaranteed program recovery contracts (the latter is 
included in our estimate of default losses in the federal programs and sub-
tracted here to avoid double-  counting). We assume the remaining unal-
located $370 million is attributable to servicing and origination functions 
of the direct and guaranteed programs in proportion to the size of each 
program. These amounts yield an estimate of amortized direct program 
origination and servicing cost of 32 basis points.
Taken together, these calculations suggest that the administrative costs of 
the direct program are about 75 bps per annum lower than on guaranteed 
loans. Again, this estimate must be interpreted with caution as it is based 
on incomplete data and simple approximations. Nevertheless, it suggests 
that real administrative cost savings could be achieved by restructuring or 
phasing out the guaranteed program.
7.4.3      Accounting for Government/  Private Diﬀerences
Diﬀerences in borrower populations, loan terms, and administrative costs 
between government and private loans could bias inferences drawn from 
private market rates and administrative data. Those diﬀerences, and their 
likely eﬀect on the estimates, are brieﬂ  y discussed here.
Borrower Defaults
The federal programs serve a much broader population of students than 
do private lenders, suggesting that their risk proﬁ  les could diﬀer. Since 
private loans appeal to students who have hit federal borrowing limits, they 
select for students at high-  cost undergraduate institutions and professional 
students in medicine, law, and business.
Several factors suggest that federal borrowers are likely poorer average 
credit risks. Federal borrowers’ eligibility does not depend on a credit score, 
whereas private lenders use credit scores to discriminate between borrowers, 
refusing credit entirely below some cutoﬀ. Private lenders also can avoid 
originating loans at schools where graduates’ employment prospects are 
weak. A partially oﬀsetting factor is that private lenders extend credit to 
students who already have high federal loan balances and who start work 
with much higher levels of total indebtedness.
17. We assume the federal program is closer to a steady state, so dividing total costs by total 
loans is a reasonable approximation of annual costs.180        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
Despite having quite diﬀerent borrower populations, federal and the lim-
ited private statistics we have access to show quite similar losses from default 
(net of recoveries and collection costs). The composition of default losses, 
however, is quite diﬀerent for the two types of borrowers. Default rates in 
the federal programs are approximately 1.8 percent of outstanding principal 
per annum, whereas they are only 1 percent per annum for private loans, 
supporting the idea that the private borrower population is less risky. The 
lower default rates in the private program, however, are oﬀset by lower recov-
ery rates. This is presumably because private lenders do not have access to 
federal collection remedies such as the Treasury oﬀset program and admin-
istrative wage garnishment. To the extent that the lower private default rate 
implies lower market risk, the cost of capital inferred from that market is 
conservative when applied to riskier federal loans. As described in section 
7.5, we estimate expected default rates on federal loans from extensive data 
on federal loans, so the cash ﬂ  ow estimates do not rely on private loan per-
formance data.
Loan Terms and Fees
As well as bearing higher interest rates, private loan terms tend to be less 
favorable than on Staﬀord loans. Private loans cannot be consolidated at 
below- market rates, repayment options are more limited, and lenders may be 
less generous with forbearance. There are no grace or deferment periods, and 
unlike federal loans, death or disability does not trigger forgiveness. Private 
loans do oﬀer loan maturities of up to twenty years, and the mechanisms to 
collect on defaulted loans are weaker than for the government. As on guar-
anteed loans (but not direct loans), lenders often oﬀer incentives for on- time 
and electronic payments, and so forth. Among these nonrate diﬀerences, 
the consolidation option historically has been the biggest advantage of the 
federal programs. In Lucas and Moore (2007), we estimate that in every year 
from 2001 to 2005 the consolidation option has added more than 2 percent 
to the market value subsidy rate on new loans,18 but with the switch to ﬁ  xed 
rates, this will have less eﬀect on relative value going forward.
Student fees appear to be somewhat higher on federal loans. Competitive 
pressures have reduced or eliminated origination fees on private loans, the 
result being that administrative costs are covered by higher rate spreads. 
Similarly, most guaranteed lenders pay the federal origination fee on 
behalf of borrowers. On direct loans, however, borrowers are still required 
to pay 1.5 percent up-  front and the entire fee if they fail to make a timely 
ﬁ  rst payment.
We make no quantitative adjustment for government/ private diﬀerentials 
in loan terms or fees. To the extent that the more generous terms on gov-
18. With the switch to ﬁ  xed rates, the consolidation option will have less value going forward, 
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ernment loans entail higher systematic risk (for instance, by increasing the 
duration of the average loan), estimates of the cost of capital based on 
private market rates are conservative.
Administrative Costs
Loan servicing is a competitive industry, and it is safe to assume that 
servicing costs are similar for government, guaranteed, and private lenders. 
Loan collection services can also be obtained at competitive prices, although 
guaranty agencies are paid a statutory amount that appears to exceed their 
cost of providing services, as discussed earlier. We assume similar collection 
costs for private and direct loans, and adjust for the subsidy component of 
payments to guarantee agencies in the guaranteed program. Some costs, 
however, are likely to be higher on private loans. Origination requires paying 
for credit scores (including those paid for students who ultimately borrow 
elsewhere or do not qualify). Private loans may also involve higher con-
tracting costs (e.g., legal expenses) than do government loans. Finally, the 
purely administrative costs associated with loan ﬁ  nancing are lower for the 
government. Securitizations of private and guaranteed loans involve fees to 
investment bankers and to rating agencies that presumably exceed Treasury’s 
administrative costs. We assume that 15 bps of the private loan cost rate can 
be attributed to these additional costs.
7.5      Estimating Federal Program Costs
Estimating a comprehensive measure of cost involves projecting the dis-
tribution of future cash ﬂ  ows to and from the government over the life of 
a loan or guarantee obligation, and discounting at risk-  adjusted rates. We 
start by modeling the cash ﬂ  ows associated with the underlying loans, taking 
into account program rules,19 borrower behavior, and the various options 
aﬀecting payment patterns. These cash ﬂ  ows, in combination with rules for 
payments between guaranteed lenders and the government, also determine 
the cash ﬂ  ows associated with guaranteed loans.
A subsample of student records from the Department of Education’s Na-
tional Student Loan Database System (NSLDS), described in appendix A, 
provides information on historical borrower payment patterns, which is used 
to parameterize the model. In particular, we derive new estimates of default 
and recovery, which are critical inputs. We use a sample from the database 
drawn in January 2006, which contained historical information on loans and 
borrowers dating back to 1980, although we used the older data only where 
absolutely necessary. The sample comprises over ten million loan records 
and one million borrowers.
19. Estimates are based on rules in eﬀect for the 2006 to 2007 program year. Recent legislative 
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We then use Monte Carlo simulation to project future cash ﬂ  ows that 
depend on a model of stochastic interest rates and borrower behavior. Dis-
counting projected net cash ﬂ  ows at the risk- adjusted rates (derived as previ-
ously described and in appendix B) yields cost estimates for both programs. 
A rougher but simpler estimate based on the diﬀerence between private and 
government student loan rates is shown to produce comparable results.
7.5.1    Cash  Flows
On direct loans, there is an initial outﬂ  ow of principal when the borrower 
takes a new loan, less fees paid by the borrower. Subsequently, net inﬂ  ows 
of repaid principal and interest ﬂ  ow to the government over time, including 
amounts recovered from default less any recovery costs. The government 
also incurs ongoing administrative costs, which we apportion to individual 
loans on a per annum basis.
In the guaranteed program, government cash ﬂ  ows include net transfers 
to and from guaranteed lenders (some through guaranty agencies) on each 
outstanding loan, equal to the diﬀerence between the borrower’s interest 
payment and the three-  month commercial paper rate plus a spread. This is 
referred to as a Special Allowance Payment, or SAP. The spread is equal to 
1.74 percent per annum for Staﬀord loans when the borrower is in school, 
2.34 percent for Staﬀord loans when the borrower is in repayment, and 2.64 
percent (less the 1.05 percent per annum lender consolidation fee) for con-
solidation loans. The government also makes guarantee payments to lenders 
for claims on defaulted loans, and pays “retention” fees to guaranty agencies 
in proportion to their recoveries on defaulted loans.
In both programs, the task of estimating cash ﬂ  ows is complicated by the 
many options available to students to defer and extend loan payments or 
to prepay, and also by default behavior. We now turn to the calibration of 
these behavioral assumptions, which is based on program rules and observed 
behavior in the NSLDS.
Eﬀective Maturity and Repayment Status
Time to repayment varies widely, from less than a year to over thirty 
years. Borrowers may prepay their federal loans without penalty, and some 
borrowers repay rapidly. For example, approximately 8 percent of origi-
nated loans close in less than ﬁ  ve years, and approximately 60 percent within 
ﬁ  fteen years (see ﬁ  gure 7.2).20
There are also various options that extend the repayment period. Bor-
rowers with high balances have standard options to extend Staﬀord loans 
beyond the basic ten- year maturity.21 The right to consolidate Staﬀord loans 
20. These estimates treat loan consolidations as an extension of the original loan rather than 
a new loan. Staﬀord loan lifetimes would otherwise appear to be much shorter than this.
21. Staﬀord borrowers with a balance of $30,000 or more from a single lender (whether a 
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allows borrowers to extend the term of their original loans, as well as to con-
vert ﬂ  oating rate loans to a ﬁ  xed rate.22 For some borrowers, consolidation 
allows them to extend for up to thirty years. Eligibility for term extension 
depends on the size of the consolidated loan, as shown in table 7.3.
While in school and for a few months after graduating, borrowers do not 
need to begin repayment. During this grace period, the federal government 
pays the interest for subsidized loans, whereas interest accrues on unsubsi-
dized loans. Periods of grace necessarily raise the market- based subsidy cost 
even for unsubsidized loans, since the interest rate that accrues is typically 
lower than the market cost of capital. Over 95 percent of loans by originated 
value are in an in-  school or grace period in the year of origination, but less 
than 10 percent of loans are in a grace period four years after origination. 
The average time in school is approximately 2.5 years (excluding time in loan 
deferral for subsequent schooling, discussed next).
Borrowers are also entitled to lengthy payment deferral in times of ﬁ  nan-
cial hardship or, for Staﬀord borrowers, to pursue further studies. Staﬀord 
Fig. 7.2    Distribution of loan lifetimes
Source: Estimates from 2006 sample of the National Student Loan Database.
ment plan of up to twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. Income contingent and graduated repayment plans are 
also available.
22. The OMB treats consolidation loans as new loans rather than the extension of existing 
loans. This leads to a higher reported loan volume, but a lower subsidy cost per Staﬀord loan 
than reported in this chapter, as we treat consolidation as an extension of existing loans. This 
treatment makes it easier to interpret default and recovery experience, and also ensures that 
the subsidy cost includes the value of the option to consolidate.184        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
loans are also forgiven in the event of death or disability of the borrower. An 
eﬀect of these provisions is that they may lower reported default rates. Peri-
ods of in-  school deferment last as long as the borrower remains in school, 
whereas borrowers experiencing ﬁ  nancial hardship may elect a three-  year 
payment deferment or payment forbearance period (the former is available 
only under more restrictive conditions). Analysis of loans in the NSLDS 
suggests that borrowers enter deferment or forbearance at a rate of approxi-
mately 6 percent per annum for a typical term of three years.
The distribution of loan maturities and repayment behavior used to cali-
brate the model are based on NSLDS data. The eﬀect of these repayment 
options is shown in ﬁ  gure 7.3, which breaks down outstanding loan principal 
by loan status in January 2006 for both the direct and guaranteed program. 
Overall, only about half of the loans are in repayment, while grace, deferral, 
forbearance, and default account for the remainder.
The future distribution of loan lifetimes may be more drawn out than indi-
cated by historical data, since the closure rates at long horizons are based on 
loans taken out when the federal loan program oﬀered less favorable terms 
to borrowers than currently or in the recent past. Nevertheless, the stochastic 
repayment behavior in the model is based on historical experience.
Default and Recovery
Borrower default is an ongoing concern in both the direct and guaranteed 
lending programs, despite the strong loan enforcement mechanisms that the 
government has at its disposal.23 Before direct lending, the guaranteed lend-
ing program reported very high default rates. In response, Congress made 
a number of changes to the Higher Education Act. Chief among them was 
the use of cohort default rates as a performance measure and as a criterion 
Table 7.3  Allowable term by balance






  30   60,000  
Notes: Allowable term for extended and graduated repayment plans in the direct program and 
for newly consolidated loans in both programs. Balance refers to total balance of loans in the 
direct program for direct program extensions and total balance of loans consolidated for 
consolidation term extension. In the guaranteed program, borrowers with balances of more 
than $30,000 can elect a twenty-  ﬁ  ve-  year extended repayment term on their original loans.
23. Student loans, both federal and private, are not dismissed in bankruptcy. The government 
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for schools to retain access to federal student loans and grant funding. Since 
the adoption of these measures, new default claims in both the direct and 
guaranteed lending programs have more than halved.
The strength of the US economy contributed to generally falling default 
rates over the period 1990 to 2005. The increased use of deferment, forbear-
ance, and consolidation may also have contributed to lower default rates, 
although oﬀering more generous terms to students is costly when it delays an 
inevitable default or makes recovery more diﬃcult. Table 7.4 reports default 
claims as a percent of outstanding balances for 1990, 1996, and 2005.
Figure 7.4 shows the average default rate of loans issued between 1996 
and 2006 by years since entering repayment for guaranteed Staﬀord, guaran-
teed consolidation, direct Staﬀord, and direct consolidation loans. Average 
default rates are around 1.8 percent per annum. Staﬀord loans experience 
higher levels shortly after entering repayment, which may in part reﬂ  ect 
the cumulative eﬀect of in-  school grace periods (since a borrower cannot 
default while he or she remains in school even though adverse circumstances 
may arise that impair a borrower’s current and future ability to repay their 
loans). Consolidated direct loans report higher default rates than consoli-
dated Staﬀord loans because the Education Department frequently con-
solidates borrowers close to default. Data conﬁ  rms that borrowers that 
consolidate defaulted loans are more likely to default on their consolida-
tion loans than other borrowers. We attribute the cost of default to the pro-
gram in which the loans were ﬁ  rst originated rather than the program that 
consolidated them.
The OMB reports recovery rates on student loans that far exceed those on 
other forms of unsecured consumer credit, but as discussed in section 7.3.3, 
their measure neglects collection costs and time value. Relying instead on 
NSLDS data, we ﬁ  nd that individual loans exhibit signiﬁ  cant variability in 
recoveries, with some defaulted loans resolved quickly and others remain-
ing uncollected for more than ten years. The typical pattern suggests that 
Fig. 7.3    Status of direct and guaranteed loan portfolio, January 2006186        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
collection rates diminish over time. Applying a risk-  adjusted discount rate 
(equal to the average interest rate over the data period plus our assumed 
2.18 percent risk premium) and subtracting a program- speciﬁ  c recovery cost 
suggests a recovery rate of around 60 percent of the defaulted principal on 
direct loans and a slightly lower rate on guaranteed loans because of higher 
recovery costs.24 Combining this with the annual default rate of 1.8 percent 
per annum implies losses from default equal to .75 percent of principal 
outstanding per annum, which is the basis for our estimates.
7.5.2    Risk-  Adjusting  Discount  Rates
A major goal of this analysis is to understand the eﬀect of market risk on 
estimated program costs. As described in section 7.4.1, an analysis of the 
Table 7.4  Default claims as a percentage of the outstanding federal loan portfolio
Budget year   1990   1996   2005
Outstanding loan portfolio ($million) 49,890 57,557 242,581
Default claims ($million) 2,384 1,428 3,818
Percentage of loans in default   4.8   2.5   1.6
Fig. 7.4    Default rates (weighted by loan value) by years since entering repayment
24. The ED indicates collection costs on direct loans of about 16 percent. Statutory collec-
tion costs are higher on guaranteed loans, as guaranty agencies retain 23 percent of recover-
ies on Staﬀord loans, 18.5 percent for loan rehabilitation, and 10 percent on loans cured by 
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private student loan market suggests an estimate of the credit risk premium 
for student loans is 2.18 percent. The 2.18 percent premium is used in the 
base case estimates, but the sensitivity analysis reports results for lower and 
higher risk premiums.
The cost of capital is also aﬀected by the term premium: the diﬀerence 
between long-  term and short-  term Treasury rates. The valuation model 
incorporates the term premium in the interest rate model, but for simplic-
ity and because there does not appear to be a strong empirical correlation 
between them, we treat the risk that generates the term premium as inde-
pendent from the risk driving credit spreads.
To the extent that program cash ﬂ  ows are proportional to loan cash ﬂ  ows, 
one can simply apply the risk-  adjusted discount rate for student loans to 
other program cash ﬂ  ows. The risk-  adjusted discount rate is a maturity-
 matched interest rate from the interest rate model plus a credit risk premium. 
Applying this discount rate to all cash ﬂ  ows is a reasonable approximation 
for the direct program, assuming that administrative costs are proportional 
to loan cash ﬂ  ows.
Correctly discounting risky cash ﬂ  ows in the guaranteed program is 
more complicated because the various components of guaranteed cash 
ﬂ  ows have diﬀerent exposures to market risk. With a 100 percent credit 
guarantee, the federal government’s cash ﬂ  ows are equivalent to directly 
lending to the student but ﬁ  nancing the loan by borrowing from the private 
sector instead of from the Treasury, and contracting with guaranteed 
lenders for origination, servicing, and part of collection (we call these 
equivalent credit arrangements implied loans).25 The cash ﬂ  ows from the 
implied student loan have interest rate risk, since they are made at a ﬁ  xed 
rate that is unrelated to market interest rates. They also have credit risk. 
Implied student loan cash ﬂ  ows are discounted at the same rate as cash 
ﬂ  ows in the direct program. In contrast the implied loan made by guar-
anteed lenders to the federal government is largely unaﬀected by default 
risk. Speciﬁ  cally, the guaranteed lender is assured of receiving full repay-
ment of principal and interest (at a ﬂ  oating rate), so there is a component 
of cash ﬂ  ow that is virtually free of default and interest rate risk. At the 
same time, there is the risk that default, prepayment, or consolidation 
will terminate or reduce the stream of lender payments (i.e., the SAP), 
which introduces an element of market risk to the administrative cost 
reimbursements.
To incorporate the eﬀect of these risks on the value of direct and guar-
anteed loans, we graft a simple two-  state model of default onto a sto-
chastic interest rate model to provide state-  dependent discount rates (or 
25. This implicitly treats borrower incentives oﬀered by lenders, retention allowances to 
guaranty agencies, and the various onetime fees between lenders and the government as part 
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state prices). Each state of the model corresponds to an interest rate and a 
borrower default state (i.e., whether default has occurred or not), allowing us 
to specify cash ﬂ  ows in each of those states and discount them accordingly. 
The appropriate discount rates diﬀerential between default and nondefault 
states is inferred from the spread between risky and risk-  free loans (and 
justiﬁ  ed by a no-  arbitrage argument). Appendix B explains the interest rate 
and risk-  adjustment models in detail.
7.5.3    Simulations
Subsidy value is estimated using Monte Carlo simulation. Each month 
a random draw from a normal distribution determines the innovation in 
the short-  term interest rate, and the corresponding term structure of inter-
est rates is derived from the Cox Ingersoll Ross (CIR) model (see Lucas 
and Moore [2007] for a complete description of the interest rate model and 
the parameters used in estimation, and also Jagannathan, Kaplin, and Sun 
[2003]). Variation in interest rates aﬀects the discount rate and guaranteed 
lender payments.
Monthly loan repayment cash ﬂ  ows depend on various borrower behav-
iors: whether the borrower is in school; the borrower’s repayment plan; 
consolidation; default, recovery, prepayment; and an administrative charge. 
Appendix B contains a description of how we simulate the cash ﬂ  ows that 
depend on stochastic borrower behavior. It also describes the aggregation 
of cash ﬂ  ows across representative loan groupings.
Base Case Assumptions
The cash ﬂ  ow model is calibrated under the following base case assump-
tions:
Borrower interest rates: From June 2006 onwards, borrowers will pay a ﬁ  xed 
rate of 6.8 percent per annum on all new Staﬀord loans. When those 
loans are subsequently consolidated, the interest charged on that portion 
of the consolidation loan that comes from post-  2006 Staﬀord loans will 
be at a 6.8 percent rate (plus up to 0.075 percent after rounding).
Repayment horizons: A typical loan repays over a twenty- year term, but any 
individual loan can be repaid over shorter or longer horizons. The prob-
ability of slower repayment is positively correlated with the borrower’s 
balance. For borrowers entering repayment, approximately one-  third of 
all loan value is in each of three balance categories, and, respectively 15, 
40, and 60 percent of borrowers in each category take up the maximum 
term extension option.
Default losses: The value of default losses each year is equal to .75 percent 
of outstanding balances in the direct program and .82 percent in the 
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higher because the federal government pays more to guaranty agencies 
for their collections from defaulted borrowers than they do to private 
contactors in the direct program.
Noncollection-  related federal administrative expenses: The federal govern-
ment incurs direct administrative expenses for both programs. These 
costs are not included in oﬃcial budget subsidy estimates, but they are 
included in the more comprehensive estimates here. Each year, we as-
sume the department directly spends 0.32 percent of outstanding princi-
pal administering the direct program (excluding collections costs ac-
counted for in default losses) and 0.1 percent administering the guaranteed 
program. The administrative costs borne by guaranteed lenders in the 
guaranteed program do not directly aﬀect subsidy rates.
Guaranteed lender payments: The federal government pays guaranteed 
lenders a spread above the quarterly reset three- month commercial paper 
rate, which is simulated using the CIR model. The spread paid to lenders 
varies with the type of loan and its payment status as described earlier, 
and terminates upon default.
Loan origination and guarantee fee receipts: The government charges bor-
rowers 3 percent in origination and guarantee fees in both programs. In 
the direct program, this reduces the subsidy cost by about 2.2 percent, 
since .8 percent is returned to students as a borrower beneﬁ  t.26 In the 
guaranteed program, 1 percent of this is transferred to guaranty agen-
cies. Finally, guaranteed lenders pay a 0.50 percent fee, but guaranty 
agencies receive four-  ﬁ  fths of it.
Adjustments for Federal revenue eﬀects: The companies that serve the direct 
and guaranteed programs pay federal corporate income taxes. To the 
extent that incremental taxable income is generated because of the fed-
eral student loan program, the corporate income taxes paid should be 
taken into account in calculating the net federal outlay. However, current 
budget practice does not recognize income tax receipts in subsidy esti-
mates, implicitly assuming no net change in private economic activity 
arises from federal actions. A recent study by Price Waterhouse Coopers 
(PWC 2005) estimated that the guaranteed lending program generates 
corporate income tax with a present value of 1.5 cents per dollar of loans 
originated, which translates to an approximate per annum tax receipt of 
20 basis points per dollar outstanding. The direct program also generates 
corporate income taxes from information technology (IT), servicing, and 
collections contracts with private companies, but PWC did not estimate 
those revenues. We assume this generates no more than 5 basis points of 
26. The ED has the option to reduce the cost to 1.5 percent for borrowers who enter repay-
ment on time. The ED estimates that approximately 50 percent of borrowers receive this 
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tax revenue, leaving a 15 basis point per annum tax diﬀerential between 
the direct and guaranteed programs. To what extent a tax oﬀset should 
be reﬂ  ected in budget estimates remains a controversial issue. In our base 
case subsidy estimates and consistent current budget practice, we ignore 
the diﬀerential tax eﬀect, but we do account for it in the sensitivity 
analysis.
7.5.4    Subsidy  Estimates
Table 7.5 presents subsidy estimates for newly originated loans in aca-
demic year 2006 (July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007) under the base case assump-
tions outlined previously. The overall subsidy rate for each program is com-
puted by averaging over representative groupings of loans by subsidized 
status and outstanding balance. Two striking ﬁ  ndings emerge. First, the 
market subsidy rates are considerably higher than those reported in the 
budget—20.1 percent for the direct program and 31.3 percent for the guar-
anteed program. Second, the market cost diﬀerential between the direct and 
guaranteed program is similar to the budget estimate, even after adjusting 
for omitted administrative costs in the direct program.
To understand these ﬁ  ndings, it is instructive to break down the costs of 
each program into their major component parts. As shown in table 7.6, the 
diﬀerence between the loan amount and the present value of student loan 
repayments accounts for the biggest cost for both programs at approximately 
20 percent of the loan amount. The higher federal servicing and origination 
expenses under the direct program are more than oﬀset by the value of fed-
eral payments to guaranteed lenders, and this diﬀerence accounts for most 
of the overall diﬀerence in subsidy rates between the two programs.
Within each program, subsidy rates vary with whether loans are “subsi-
dized,” and with the availability of longer loan terms (table 7.5). Costs are 
Table 7.5  Base case market-  based subsidy estimates for new Staﬀord loans 
originated in award year 2006
    Direct   Guaranteed   Diﬀerence
Unsubsidized loans
    Up to 10-  year term 11.7 22.0 10.3
    Up to 20-  year term 13.5 25.3 11.8
    Up to 30-  year term 14.7 27.1 12.4
Weighted average subsidy of unsubsidized loans 17.5 27.6 10.1
Subsidized loans
    Up to 10-  year term 25.4 34.3 8.9
    Up to 20-  year term 27.0 37.0 10.1
    Up to 30-  year term 28.6 39.2 10.6
Weighted average subsidy of subsidized loans 30.4 39.0 8.6
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higher for subsidized than for unsubsidized loans by the present value of in- 
grace and in-  deferment interest paid by borrowers with unsubsidized loans 
that is not paid by borrowers with subsidized loans. A typical subsidized 
borrower spends around three years in grace and deferment, and avoids 
paying the 6.8 percent interest rate during these periods. This increases the 
subsidy to the student by about 12 percent of the loan amount.
Subsidy rates increase with loan maturity. Allowing borrowers to extend a 
ten- year Staﬀord year loan to twenty years raises the subsidy rate by about 3 
percent. This takes into account that many borrowers fail to take advantage 
of term extension options and frequently pay their loans oﬀ early, so poten-
tially the extension cost could be even higher if borrower behavior changes.
7.5.5    Sensitivity  Analysis
Borrower Behavior and Economic Conditions
Aggregate subsidy estimates under alternative assumptions about model 
parameters are shown in table 7.7. Subsidy estimates are quite sensitive to the 
assumed risk premium. Assuming a 1 percent higher (lower) risk premium 
than in the base case raises (lowers) subsidy rates by 7 percent. For the direct 
program, this is most easily understood as a higher discount rate, reducing 
the value of future repayments. On the guaranteed loans, the eﬀect of market 
risk is to raise the present value of guarantee payments made on defaulted 
loans. By contrast, the credit risk premium has a small eﬀect on the present 
value of net income payments to guaranteed lenders. The eﬀective dura-
tion of the loans also aﬀects value, with loan extension generally increasing 
cost. This can be attributed to the below-  market interest rate charged to 
borrowers. Table 7.6 reports subsidy costs with 25 percent faster and slower 
loan repayment rates, which serve to lengthen or shorten the average loan 
term by approximately four years. The increase (decrease) raises (lowers) 
Table 7.6  Components of subsidy rate
    Direct  Guaranteed
Loan disbursement 100.0 100.0
Present value of loan repayment (after collection) –79.8 –79.8
Borrower origination fees –3.0 –3.0
Net present value of representative loan 17.1 17.1
plus
Federal servicing and origination expenses 2.1 0.8
Direct program origination fee reduction 0.8 n.a.
Lender origination fees n.a. –0.7
Lender share of guaranteed loan losses n.a. –0.2
Lender special allowance payments n.a. 13.2
Guaranty agency origination and excess collection fees n.a. 1.1
Subsidy rate   20.1   31.3192        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
subsidy costs by about 2 percent. The ﬁ  nal experiment assumes that with the 
less favorable conditions for consolidation going forward, more loans will 
be extended in the Staﬀord program rather than being consolidated. This 
scenario raises the subsidy rate in the guaranteed program because of the 
higher lender payments on Staﬀord loans.
Looking to the future, subsidy rates for new loans may be considerably 
diﬀerent from the estimates for 2006 reported in table 7.5. The most obvious 
cause of future variation in new loan subsidy rates is changes in interest rate 
conditions. This is because borrower interest rates are ﬁ  xed at 6.8 percent 
per annum for all new Staﬀord loans, whereas the government’s oppor-
tunity cost moves with prevailing interest rates. Figures 7.5 and 7.6 show 
simulated average, tenth, and ninetieth percentiles of the subsidy estimates 
for, respectively, the direct and guaranteed programs over each of the next 
ten years. To make these forecasts, we use the interest rate model combined 
with current yield curve information to provide simulated paths of future 
interest rates to determine starting conditions for each year. We assume 
loan cash ﬂ  ow performance is consistent with the assumptions of the base 
case (but appropriate to interest rate conditions). As the horizon lengthens, 
the course of future interest rates becomes more uncertain so the band of 
subsidy values widens in both programs.
Finally, we consider a set of parameters that are more favorable to 
guaranteed lending. We credit the guaranteed program with 15 bps per 
annum for tax revenues, and allocate a higher portion of administra-
tive costs incurred by the Department of Education to direct lending.27 
Table 7.7  Parameter sensitivity of subsidy rates
    Direct  Guaranteed  Diﬀerence
Base case subsidy rate 20.1 31.3 11.2
Varying credit risk and credit risk premium
    High credit risk premium (3.58% p.a.) 26.2 36.2 10.0
    Low credit risk premium (1.58% p.a.) 12.6 25.3 12.7
    No credit risk premium 1.1 16.5 15.4
Speed of repayment
    25% faster than base case 17.3 27.1 9.8
    25% slower than base case 22.3 34.6 12.3
    Not sensitive to interest rates 19.8 31.0 11.2
Other
  No  treasury  ﬁ  nancing advantage in direct program 21.9 31.3 9.4
  Longer  Staﬀord repayments/reduced consolidation  20.3   31.5   11.2
Note: p.a.  per annum.
27. In this scenario, 90 percent of the $360 billion in unallocated costs is assumed to be for 
the direct loan program, whereas in the base case it is allocated proportionally to loan volume. 
This reduces the administrative cost advantage in the direct program from 75 basis points to 
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All other assumptions are as in the base case. The result is a narrowing 
of the subsidy rate diﬀerence of the two programs from 11.2 percent to 
8.0 percent.
Policy Alternatives
The model is also useful for examining the eﬀect of various policy alter-
natives on subsidy costs. One option is to lower the guaranteed lender pay-
ments to bring the guaranteed subsidy closer to the direct loan subsidy rate, 
and to reduce the excess of payments over basic administrative costs. The 
ﬁ  rst two rows of table 7.8 report the predicted subsidy estimates after lower-
ing lenders’ payments by 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent per annum, respectively. 
The eﬀect of the 1.0 percent reduction is to bring the subsidy in the guaran-
teed program to within 5 percent of the direct program. The calculations in 
the next section suggest, however, that a reduction of this magnitude might 
make guaranteed lending unproﬁ  table for many lenders. The 0.5 percent 
reduction still leaves a cost diﬀerential of 9.1 percent between the programs. 
The cuts in lender payments enacted in 2007 are at the lower end of this 
range, suggesting a lower but still signiﬁ  cant cost diﬀerential for loans origi-
nated after September 2007.
Another set of alternatives relate to whether the interest rate paid by 
borrowers is ﬁ  xed or ﬂ  oating. Switching from variable to ﬁ  xed interest rates 
on Staﬀord loans has increased the subsidy cost for 2006 by approximately 
Fig. 7.5    Distribution of future subsidy rates given interest rate uncertainty in the 
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2 percent, in part because the opportunity cost of a ﬁ  xed rate loan is 
higher than for variable rate loans (because the term premium is posi-
tive), and in part because our long-  term interest rate projection implies 
the variable rate will average more than 6.8 percent. The switch to ﬁ  xed 
rates also exposes the government to interest rate risk. If market inter-
est rates continue to increase, subsidy costs on loans originated after 
2006 could be signiﬁ  cantly higher than they would be under the variable 
rate policy.
Changing the level of rates charged to students also obviously aﬀects cost. 
Table 7.8  Subsidy rates under alternative policies
    Direct  Guaranteed  Diﬀerence
Base case 20.1 31.3 11.2
    Cut annual lender payments by 0.5% 20.8 28.0 7.7
    Cut annual lender payments by 1.0% 20.9 25.2 4.8
    Floating rates as under 1998–2006 law 19.4 30.6 11.2
    Floating rates but without ﬂ  oor on Lender’s Special Allowance 19.4 30.0 10.6
    3.4% rate on loans—without behavioral response 37.4 47.2 9.8
    3.4% rate on loans—with behavioral response 40.5 50.3 9.8
  90%  federal  guarantee 20.1 28.7 8.6
  75%  federal  guarantee   20.1   25.4   5.3
Fig. 7.6    Distribution of future subsidy rates given interest rate uncertainty in the 
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Recent legislation will gradually reduce the rate on loans to undergradu-
ate students until it is 3.4 percent in 2011. All else equal, this increases the 
subsidy rate by approximately 16 percentage points. In fact, the subsidy cost 
likely will increase by more than this since the lower rate provides incentive 
for borrowers to reduce prepayment rates, and to switch to longer term 
repayment plans.28
7.6      Decomposition of Guaranteed Lender Costs
The analysis thus far has focused on government costs. Here we look 
at costs from the perspective of a guaranteed lender. This decomposition 
is useful in considering how much government payments to lenders could 
be reduced without causing many lenders to exit the market, and also for 
quantifying the extent to which guaranteed lending is fundamentally more 
expensive.
Our decomposition of guaranteed lender costs relies on section 7.4 cal-
culations of administrative and capital costs. As mentioned earlier, these 
estimates are based on limited data and the costs of individual lenders may 
vary considerably. Recall that lenders are guaranteed of receiving the three-
  month commercial paper rate plus a spread that averages about 2.28 per-
cent on Staﬀord loans, and 1.59 percent on Consolidation loans. Estimated 
lender origination, servicing, and other expenses are .97 percent. Subtract-
ing this from the guaranteed payment rate leaves a margin of 1.31 percent 
(2.28 –   .97) on Staﬀord loans and .62 on Consolidation loans (1.59 –   .97). 
The 2007 legislative cuts to lender payments absorb less than half of this 
margin on Staﬀord loans, but almost all of it on Consolidation loans. These 
calculations may explain the subsequent exit of many lenders from the con-
solidation business in recent years, and that some borrower beneﬁ  ts have 
been reduced or eliminated.
The amount by which guaranteed lending as it is currently structured 
is fundamentally more expensive than direct lending can be estimated by 
comparing the administrative expenses and funding costs of the programs. 
Our estimates suggest that on the high end, this disadvantage is 105 bps per 
annum—based on a 75 basis point administrative cost disadvantage relative 
to the direct program, and a 30 bp funding disadvantage relative to Treasury. 
Capitalizing the resulting annual cost diﬀerential of 105 basis points over 
the life of a typical loan yields a present value cost advantage equal to 5.34 
percent of loan principal.
28. The availability of such low cost credit could lead to abnormally high lending volumes, 
which would increase the total dollar subsidy. Moreover, the subsidy will increase on a per loan 
basis if borrowers choose to prepay their loans less frequently. We estimated the latter eﬀect 
using the historic response of borrower prepayment to the level of interest rates for ﬁ  xed rate 
consolidation loans and found that accounting for reduced prepayment in high interest rate 
environments increases the subsidy by approximately 3 percent.196        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
7.7    Conclusions
In this chapter we have developed a model that provides comprehensive 
estimates of the federal cost of providing student loans, which takes into 
account the eﬀect of borrower behavior, economic conditions, and program 
rules. We ﬁ  nd that the cost of both the direct and guaranteed student loan 
programs is signiﬁ  cantly understated in the federal budget, primarily because 
the budget neglects the full cost of capital, but also because of the way admin-
istrative costs are accounted for. This is important because it suggests that the 
relatively rapid growth of federal funding for student loans relative to out-
right grants may have been inﬂ  uenced by misleading estimates of loan cost.
Our second major ﬁ  nding is that even after adjusting for the cost of capital 
and administrative costs that are omitted in the budget, the direct program is 
considerably less costly to the government than is the guaranteed program. 
It appears that the higher cost of the guaranteed program arises primarily 
from the statutory payments to guaranteed lenders that exceed their cost 
of oﬀering loans. Even if payments to lenders were cut to the minimum 
required to induce participation, the guaranteed program appears to be 
fundamentally more expensive due to a market structure that entails higher 
administrative and capital costs.
Despite its higher cost and recent concerns about certain lending prac-
tices, the guaranteed program has survived periodic attempts to supplant 
it with direct lending. History shows that the political fortunes of the two 
programs have shifted over time, but that cost has yet to be a decisive factor.29 
The 2007 legislation that cuts payments to guaranteed lenders and creates 
new advantages for the direct program will reduce future cost diﬀerences, 
and will likely increase direct lending volume at the expense of guaranteed 
lenders. However, the changes were for the most part incremental: they do 
not address the factors that make guaranteed lending fundamentally more 
expensive, and lenders still receive ﬁ  xed compensation rather than a competi-
tively determined payment.30 The question of how these costs could be more 
eﬀectively controlled is an important one that we leave for future analyses.
The ﬁ  nancial crisis that began in late 2008 placed unprecedented stresses 
on the guaranteed student loan program. Despite the government guaran-
tee, the securitization market for student loans collapsed and rate spreads 
ballooned. To ensure continuity in funding for students, the Department 
of Education stepped in and purchased new originations from guaranteed 
lenders ﬁ  nanced by Treasury. It has also prompted stronger calls for scaling 
back the role of guaranteed lending.
29. The New America Foundation (2009) provides a lively description of the history of the 
competing programs.
30. A provision that introduces an auction for some PLUS loans does take a step toward 
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Appendix A
Description of NSLDS Data
The Department of Education administers the National Student Loan 
Database System (NSLDS), a record-  keeping system that tracks the status 
of individual loans and borrowers. The Congressional Budget Oﬃce receives 
an annual subsample of loan and borrower records each January, which it 
uses to make cost estimates. The database comprises multiple linked ﬁ  les 
containing current and historical information about borrowers and their 
loans. The ﬁ  les used to produce market- based subsidy estimates in this chap-
ter are as follows.
Loan ﬁ  le: The ﬁ  le comprises one record per loan on the type of loan (direct 
or guaranteed, consolidated or original), the date the loan was taken, the 
amount disbursed, the principal outstanding at the time the sample was 
drawn, the current status of the loan, and the academic level of the stu-
dent when the loan was taken. Each loan record also contains a unique 
identiﬁ  er for the borrower, school, and guaranty agency associated with 
the loan, making aggregation of loans by borrower possible. The ﬁ  le 
contains 5.42m loan records for 1.30m distinct borrowers, spanning the 
period from 1985 to 2006.
Loan status history ﬁ  le: The ﬁ  le contains a sequence of records with dates 
and codes for each loan’s status changes. A status change occurs for var-
ious reasons including: entering repayment, default, deferment, forbear-
ance, consolidation, and payment in full. The historical timing of status 
changes provides a basis for estimating the probability that new loans 
transition through the various statuses over their lifetime. The ﬁ  le con-
tains 25.60 million records for 5.42 million distinct loans.
IRS and guaranty agency collections ﬁ  les: These ﬁ  les track the timing and 
amount collected by the IRS, guaranty agencies, the Department of Ed-
ucation, and their contracted agents from borrowers with guaranteed 
loans in default. No recovery information is available on direct program 
loans in default. The ﬁ  les contain the amount collected and date of col-
lection for each defaulted loan. The amounts recovered by issuing the 
borrower with a consolidation loan are not recorded as a dollar amount 
so the value must be imputed. Collection amounts are combined with 
historical loan status changes of defaulted loans in the loan status his-
tory ﬁ  le to compute a recovery rate on defaulted guaranteed loans, which 
we assume is very similar to that in the direct program. The IRS oﬀset ﬁ  le 
contains 340,000 loans on 156,000 loans. The combined guaranty agency 
and departmental collection ﬁ  le contains 4.05 million records on 355,000 
distinct borrowers.198        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
Several features limit the usefulness of this data set for estimating loan 
cash ﬂ  ows over time. Except for the collections on defaulted loans, the CBO 
sample of NSLDS loans does not contain a record of borrower payments 
over time. Similarly, when the sample is drawn each January, only the current 
level of outstanding principal is recorded. Another problem is that repay-
ment plans are not reported, making it diﬃcult to infer loan lifetimes and 




Loans originate at time 0, begin repayment at time TR, and have a matu-
rity of TM so the loan is repaid in TR   TM months. Variable TM depends 
on whether the consolidation option is exercised or, in the counterfactual 
case, the loan term is extended. The original maturity of Staﬀord loans is 
ten years. See later in this appendix a description of the stochastic rules 
governing consolidation and extension.
Interest accrues on outstanding principal every month, except for Subsi-
dized loans when the borrower is in school, deferment, or default. The bor-
rower interest rate in period t, denoted Rj
S,t, is either 0 percent, 6.8 percent, 
or 6.875 percent, depending on the type and status of the loan.32
The variable Pj
t denotes the evolution of principal (prior to default) over 
time in each simulation j. Given an initial principal of Pj
0   P0, principal 
evolves according to:
(1)  Pj
t 1   Pj
t [1   rj
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S,t)1/ 12   1
is the monthly compounding student rate. The prescribed monthly payment, 
Aj
t, depends on the loan’s status, and is based on amortizing the principal at 
the current interest rate over the remaining life of the loan:
(3) 
Aj




S,t   
1   (1   r j
S,t) k,  t   TR
 0,  t   TR.
31. This appendix uses some of the text, ﬁ  gures, and equations in appendix 2 of Lucas and 
Moore (2007).
32. The numerical implementation of the model is ﬂ  exible enough to accommodate ﬂ  oating 
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Borrowers may pay more or less than this prescribed amount due to 
default, prepayment, consolidation, deferment, and forbearance. Because 
we do not have reliable data on actual payments, we assume that borrow-
ers make the prescribed payment unless they default on their loans, prepay 
their loans in their entirety, defer, or receive forbearance on their loans. In 
the direct program, the government’s cash ﬂ  ows on performing loans are the 
student loan payments less an administrative charge:
(4)  Aj
t   fPj
t,
where f is the proportional administrative fee. The fee is 0.50 percent per 
annum in the benchmark calibration, reﬂ  ecting typical servicing and other 
administrative costs of the direct program. In default, the government recov-
ers in proportion to the present value of remaining payments.
In the guaranteed lending program, the government cash ﬂ  ows are the 
quarterly payments to lenders—the SAP less any consolidation fee paid by 
lenders to the government—while the loan is in good standing, and the lump 
sum payment of outstanding principal and accrued interest in the event of 
default. We ignore administrative costs since they are largely borne by the 
guaranteed lender.
The quarterly SAP is the diﬀerence between the student rate and the three-
  month commercial paper rate plus a spread, but has a ﬂ  oor of zero. We 
assume the annualized three-  month commercial paper rate, RC, tracks the 
t-  bill rate with a 20 basis point spread:
(5)  R j
C,t   exp4yj3k, 3k   
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12   .002   1, ∀t   1, 2, . . . , T.
Absent default, the government cash ﬂ  ow in each month is the SAP less 
any consolidation fee paid from lenders to the government (1.05 percent of 
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C,3k   2.64%   Rj
S,3k]   1.05%)
     
4
, 3k   tC ∀k   0, 1, 2, . . . 
 0,  otherwise.
In default, the government pays the outstanding principal, Pj
t, to the 
lender, assumes the loan, and recovers in proportion to the present value of 
the remaining outstanding payments. The default and recovery rates used in 
the calibration are described in a later section of this appendix.200        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
Stochastic Rules Governing Borrower Behavior
Borrowers make a variety of decisions that can dramatically shorten or 
lengthen the life of their loans, and correspondingly raise or lower their 
monthly payments. Borrowers do not enter repayment until six months 
after completing their course of study so loans taken early in the borrower’s 
degree will have longer periods of nonrepayment than loans taken later. 
Some students shorten or extend the duration of their studies, which adds 
an uncertain element to the time until a borrower begins repayment. Upon 
entering repayment, borrowers typically enter a standard ten-  year repay-
ment plan but borrowers with larger balances can choose a longer repayment 
plan of twenty-  ﬁ  ve years or consolidate their loans into a new loan with 
terms as long as thirty years. Some borrowers that have left school but take 
further studies are entitled to payment deferment and borrowers experienc-
ing ﬁ  nancial hardship are entitled to loan forbearance. We model the take 
up of these options using a sample of loans from the NSLDS (as described 
in appendix A).
In estimating the time before entering repayment, we abstract from the 
uncertainty and simply assume that all loans experience in- school plus grace 
period of two years.33 On the other hand, we assume loan consolidation and 
loan prepayment behavior are random and sensitive to prevailing interest 
rates. Prepayment and consolidation may also be related to default rates but, 
for simplicity, we ignore this. Default rates are discussed in the next section 
of this appendix.
We posit a rule for the intensity of consolidation for a given loan that 
is consistent with the Probit model described in appendix A. Speciﬁ  cally, 
consolidation is decreasing in the student interest rate and decreasing in the 
time since repayment begins. We assume borrowers consolidate loans during 
the grace period consistent with the rule for consolidation at other times, 
but cannot consolidate at all while they are in school.34 Thus, the annualized 
probability of consolidation, qC,t, at month t is
(7) 
qj
C,t   
0,  t   TR   6
    1    2 max
t   TR
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where   is the cumulative standard normal distribution function and  1 
and  2 are loan- type speciﬁ  c parameters, based on probit estimates reported 
in Lucas and Moore (2007). Table 7A.1 summarizes these parameters for 
loan type.
Forbearance and deferment rates are likely to exhibit correlation with 
33. Averaging the subsidy costs over a distribution of repayment start dates yields similar 
results when the mean of the distribution is the same as the ﬁ  xed repayment rate used.
34. For the 2006 academic year, borrowers were allowed to consolidate during their in- school 
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both interest rates and borrower default rates, as well as the borrowers’ 
cumulative loan balance. For simplicity, we ignore these correlations and just 
assume that each year a loan has a 6 percent chance of entering deferment 
or forbearance for a ﬁ  xed duration of three years. By assumption, each loan 
enters deferment or forbearance at most one time, which results in a cumu-
lative ten year rate of deferment and forbearance of approximately 0.55 in 
base case calibrations. During this period borrowers do not make payments, 
hence At   0 for each period t.
Adjusting Discount Rates for Default Risk
Under the CIR model, the risk-  neutral monthly compounded discount 
rate, dt, for default free but possibly interest rate contingent monthly cash 
ﬂ  ows is
(8)  dt   
1
  
p(t,t   1/12)
   1 ∀t   0, 1, 2, . . . . 
In both the direct and guaranteed lending programs, the underlying pay-
ments between parties are contingent on default. We assume that default 
occurs with probability q in each month until the borrower completely repays 
the loan and that default risk is orthogonal to interest rate risk. To establish a 
simple no- arbitrage pricing mechanism for interest rate and default sensitive 
cash ﬂ  ows, we suppose there is a pair of simple one- period securities traded 
in every period. The ﬁ  rst is risk free, oﬀering a certain payoﬀ of one dollar in 
one period’s time. The second is a risky claim that pays one dollar if the bor-
rower does not default and   if the borrower does default. The fair price of 




1   dt
.
With a constant monthly risk premium of   and a default probability of q, 
the fair price of the risky claim is:36
35. We omit the subscript j in the remainder of this appendix.
36. The probability of default and the risk premium can be time varying, but this is sup-
pressed for simplicity.
Table 7A.1  Parameters determining the annual frequency of consolidation
Maximum eligible consolidation 




Proportion of loans 
consolidating over 10 years  1    2
10 years –1.94 –0.03 0.16
20 years –0.6 –0.09 0.55
30 years   –0.43  –0.16  0.51202        Deborah Lucas and Damien Moore
(10) 
1   q(1    )
  
(1   dt)(1    )
.
More conveniently, we can deﬁ  ne state price deﬂ  ators to value cash ﬂ  ows in 




1   dt
and if the borrower does not default:
(12) 
1   h
 
1   dt
,
where h is the risk-  neutral probability of default:
(13)  h   
    q(1    )
  
(1    )(1    )
.
Calibrating State Prices for Default Contingent Prices
Data from the NDSL suggests a cumulative default rate of 15 percent over 
the life of a typical Staﬀord loan. Default rates vary over the life of a loan, 
with the rate decreasing as the loan ages. Abstracting from the time pattern, 
an annual default rate of 2 percent is consistent with this cumulative expe-
rience. Hence, the quarterly default rate, q, is set to .25 percent. Estimates 
from the NSLDS suggest a recovery rate on defaulted loans in the range of 
40 to 60 percent. We assume the midpoint of 50 percent in the computation 
of subsidy cost for the two programs.
Present Value of Program Cash Flows
For a given sequence of interest rates, the transition of a loan through 
defaulting and nondefaulting states can be represented as a binomial tree. 
Figure 7A.1, panel A, shows borrower payments on a direct loan in a two-
  period binomial tree. The tree tracks the status of the loan over time, with 
discrete intervals of time indicated on the horizontal axis. From a given 
node, each upward move indicates the borrower does not default in the 
subsequent period, and each downward move corresponds to a borrower 
default. To ensure a stationary representation, rather than terminate the 
loan after default, we assume that the borrower and lender agree to a new 
loan with payments reduced to fraction   of the originally prescribed pay-
ments (reﬂ  ecting failed collections and collection costs).37 That is, the lender 
recovers a lump sum proportional to the present value of remaining pay-
ments. Cash ﬂ  ows in each state can be priced back to the previous period by 
using the default and nondefault state prices in equations (26) and (27) and 
37. This makes it possible to calibrate the risk premium using the observed loan spread above 




Fig. 7A.1    Binomial representation for the cash ﬂ  ows of a two-  period student loan 
for a given simulation of interest rates
to earlier periods by applying (26) and (27) recursively. The present value of 
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where
(15)  s   
1    
  
1   q(1    )
   1.
The variable s has an interpretation as the monthly credit spread, which 
depends on the rate of default (q), the rate of recovery ( ), and the risk 
premium for credit risk ( ). Assuming the administrative fee is paid only 
while the loan is not in default (only along the uppermost branches of the 
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.
Thus, the present value of a direct loan is the diﬀerence between equation 
(14) and (16). The cash ﬂ  ows for the guarantee also have a binomial tree 
representation, as shown in panel B of ﬁ  gure 7A.1 for the two- period case. 
These cash ﬂ  ows can be decomposed into two simpler binomial trees, as 
displayed in panel C of ﬁ  gure 7A.1. The ﬁ  rst is just the binomial tree for 
the student loan and the second is a residual that captures the net pay-
ments to lenders as described in section 7.5.3. Those lender payments have 
only two nonzero branches in each period because the loan is assumed to 
become federal property following default. Valuing the two components 
of using the risk-  neutral discount rates and probabilities of default gives 
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Comment  Janice C. Eberly
This chapter brings rigorous quantitative evaluation to an important policy 
topic, and hence it is hard to quarrel with either the motivation or the execu-
tion. Student lending is important both as a Federal budget item and as a 
component of household balance sheets (as I argue later). Moreover, student 
loans are an instrument of access to higher education. Largely as a result of 
these programs, some prominent researchers argue that ﬁ  nancing should no 
longer be considered a barrier to college enrollment (Carneiro and Heckman 
2005). Nonetheless, policymakers should remain vigilant about the cost and 
eﬃciency of the programs that provide this access.
The chapter makes three contributions. First, it provides a primer on 
student lending programs, which are large and ubiquitous in higher educa-
tion in the United States. Second, the chapter makes an important techni-
cal contribution by calculating the cost of student loans in the main fed-
eral programs. This is a substantial undertaking because of the complexity 
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